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ABSTRACT: 
 
The aim of this article is to analyse the concept of governability of collective bargaining proposed by 
Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel (2001) and to demonstrate its explanatory capacity and limitations in the 
Spanish case. Governability is today an important subject that should be taken into account in the reform 
of industrial relations systems and in the debate between centralisation and decentralisation of collective 
bargaining in Europe. Our main hypothesis is drawn up in line with the institutionalist approach. We will 
argue and document with the results of collective bargaining, that the Spanish system of collective 
bargaining, in spite of the organizational weakness of the unions and of the employers associations, is 
governable thanks to the role of the state, the institutions, the legal ordering, as well as the tradition and 
the custom.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Centralised collective bargaining models that have strong organisational 
structures favouring governability (Austria and the Scandinavian countries) have 
contrasted with decentralised models of bargaining (Great Britain) that make 
governability more difficult (Traxler, 1996). We maintain that beyond the issue of 
centralisation or decentralisation of collective bargaining, the governability of an 
industrial relations system can also be attained by means other than through the 
organisational power of the social partners. Governability is also attainable through 
labour legislation, tradition and the customs of the social partners insofar as these 
practices contribute to macroeconomic stability and reduce the transaction cost of 
negotiations (see also Veneziani, 1999).  
 
The study of collective bargaining and its governability in Spain provides 
examples of our point of view. The governability of Spanish trade union and employers’ 
organisation is based on a series of institutional traits that guarantees the representative 
nature and power of the partners. Collective bargaining carried out basically at an 
intermediate level is conditioned by these traits and by labour market regulations that 
affect its development and content. 
 
The conceptual definition of governability1 
 
 Governability is defined as the capacity of the actors of industrial relations 
systems (the State – trade unions – employers) to influence and control the key elements  
of macroeconomic policy, and in particular to coordinate pay policy, control inflation, 
generate employment and redistribute income. Our aim is to examine the governability 
of the Spanish collective bargaining system, which some authors (Bentolila and  
Gimeno 2002) claim to be ungovernable or even unarticulated and without any 
hierarchical order between levels (Traxler 2003). Our hypothesis takes a different and 
                                                 
1 The authors wish to thank to Maria da Paz Campos Lima for her kindly comments of this article. 
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original line: the collective bargaining system is governable thanks to the institutional 
characteristics of the industrial relations system.    
 
According to the Austrian researchers (Traxler, Blaschke and  Kittel 2001: 105-
111), the operationalisation of the concept of governability leads us to analyse three 
dimensions: power, domain and control:  
 
Power: This dimension is contingent on the degree of collective bargaining 
coverage, which expresses the extent of the benefits of collective action compared 
with two other alternatives for regulating employment: individual and market 
regulation, and the regulatory action of the State through legislation. In democratic 
regimes free collective bargaining is the fundamental mechanism of employment 
regulation, though in some countries its coverage is extended through erga omnes 
clauses.  
 
The dimension of power also aims to measure the degree of representation of the 
social partners, which regards generally the number of members. However, in Latin 
countries, due to trade union organisational pluralism and competition, in order to 
analyse the power and legitimacy of the social partners one must consider the degree 
of representativeness regarding the number of trade union delegates elected in 
systems based on the electoral audience2.  
Domain: This dimension expresses the presence of the social partners in the spheres 
of bargaining and on bargaining commissions, and their degree of organisation and 
articulation of the trade unions and employers' associations. An example of this is 
the degree of coordination or autonomy of the different levels of bargaining:  
company, sector,  region and confederation.  
 
                                                 
2 In accordance with the ILO criteria, we can distinguish two different concepts. The concept of 
representation has a quantitative significance and is generally taken as a reference through the number of 
members of trade unions. This form of representation is proper to the German, Nordic, and Anglo-Saxon 
spheres. Then there is the concept of representative status, which has a qualitative significance. By means 
of legal mechanisms the public authorities confer an extra strength on trade unions and business 
organisations in order to compensate for their weakness or difficulties linked to the process of association. 
This form of representative status is proper to the countries in southern Europe. 
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Control capacity: This dimension expresses the form of centralised coordination—
the way in which the different and fragmented interests of the workers can be 
synchronised and harmonised in line with the more general interests, which could in 
turn be linked to the participation and commitment of the social partners in the 
orientation of economic policy. The concept of control capacity also refers to the 
decentralisation/articulation of collective bargaining, its “depth” and the “capacity 
of control and administration of the collective agreement at workplace level, as 
studied by Clegg (1985) in a comparative research project.  
 
The theoretical debate on the structure of collective bargaining 
 
Comparative studies regarding European convergence have concentrated on the 
institutional structure of collective bargaining , and attention is currently focusing on the 
centralised and decentralised bargaining models. The centralised model is found 
particularly in Nordic and Germanic countries. It involves advantages such as the 
possibility of aligning pay and other variables of collective bargaining with the 
objectives of macroeconomic policy. It also allows for better governability, 
administration, control and management of the subjects agreed between the social 
partners (Grote; Schmitter, 1999). The centralisation of the trade unions and employers' 
organisations (neo-corporatist structures) in turn facilitates the centralisation of 
collective bargaining and therefore provides a disciplined framework for the substantive 
rules negotiated (as in the case of the Scandinavian countries and Austria in particular). 
On the other hand, the decentralised collective bargaining model, which is found in 
Anglo-Saxon countries is more ungovernable and conflictive, but offers advantages 
such as a greater capacity to adapt the content of collective agreements to the specific 
situations of companies or workplaces, faster adjustment to variations in demand, and a 
microeconomic orientation (Traxler; Mermet, 2003). According to the inverted U of 
Calmfors and Drifill (1988), the two extremes of centralisation and decentralisation 
offer better results against inflation and unemployment than an intermediate degree of 
centralisation. 
 
Some analysts consider the Spanish collective bargaining model to be the worst of 
all, because it is neither decentralised like the British one nor centralised like the 
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Scandinavian one. According to Bentolila and Jimeno (2002), the Spanish mixed 
structure is the worst  in terms of adjustment and adaptation of bargaining to variations 
in the economic cycle.  
    
Economic models and governability of policy wages. 
 
In accordance with the proposals of Hall and Soskice (2001; see also Aarvaag, 
1999), economies are differentiated into two major groups regarding the institutional 
framework, i.e.  the regulations, rules, and forms of conduct that affect the behaviour 
and types of co-ordination between enterprises and social partners: liberal market 
economies and co-ordinated market economies. These two economy models are 
differentiated by a network of social relations and interactions that shareholders in firms 
establish, as well as by the presence of social partners, trade unions, and employers’ 
associations in labour markets. The institutional design of the relations between 
shareholders and enterprises and of the relations between trade unions and employers’ 
associations conditions the economic results. Such interactions and relations can be 
studied through the mechanisms of co-ordination that they establish for policy wages 
and even for working conditions and solutions of conflicts (see Bordogna; Cella, 1999). 
 
Two levels of co-ordination can be established: the co-ordination of the 
corporate government of firms and the co-ordination of industrial relations. The two 
levels condition each other, and for this reason there is interaction between changes at 
the company level and changes at the social partner level. 
 
a) The first level of co-ordination comes about in the corporate government 
of firms: here it is necessary to study the power of shareholders through the 
existence of legal regulations that protect and moderate their interests in firms, the 
degree of dispersion or concentration of the company’s shareholders, and the size of 
the capital market. 
b) The second level of co-ordination lies in industrial relations: here it is 
necessary to take note of the level of co-ordination in wage-fixing, or in other words 
the mechanisms of collective bargaining, their degree of centralisation and the co-
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ordination of strategies between the various social agents, as well as of the degree of 
rotation of workers in firms. 
 
From this methodological approach, Djankov’s theory of the legal system 
(Djankov et al. 2003) proposes that institutions are the result of the legal tradition and of 
the national style existing in a country and that various strategies and institutional 
technologies are used to confront market failures and the social control of businesses. 
Thus, the countries that have general laws tend to be based more on markets and on 
contracts, and the countries that have more specific laws (juridified systems) tend to be 
based more on regulation and the existence of public enterprises. 
 
The governability of trade union and employers’ organisations 
 
A second set of theoretical contributions to consider are those whose theoretical 
substratum analyses the behaviour of social partners. In this regard, the proposals made 
by Checchi and Lucifora (2002) for trade unions can be applied to the case of Spain. 
According to some analysts associated with the Bank of Spain and with employers’ 
sectors, the Spanish trade unions carry out their activity in a regulated labour market 
environment in which legislation provides greater guarantees of employment than in 
other countries by requiring notice of dismissal, regulating short-term contracts and 
working hours, and offering high subsidies and provision for unemployment. In this 
context the trade unions reinforce their bargaining power. 
 
Two main approaches are used to explain the role of employers’ organisations in 
collective bargaining. In the first, it is contended that the motives that lead to bargaining 
are to be found in the reduction of the transaction costs of collective bargaining 
processes (Doner and  Schneider 2000). In the case of Spain, the costs of bargaining, as 
well as the weight of tradition, represent a variable that is explanatory of employer 
behaviour. In the second, the use of collective bargaining is seen as a mechanism of 
wage-cost control on the part of firms that have market power in their sector and that are 
protagonists or leaders in bargaining systems (Haucaup, Pauly and Wey 1999, and 
Heidhmes 2000), which would explain the peculiarities of the case of Spain. In 
accordance with the thesis of organisational minimalism (Lanzalaco 1995), the 
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organisational structure of the various employers’ organisations is not articulated, 
because firms preserve the principle of autonomy in order to avoid being subjected to 
and conditioned by agreements made in higher spheres that may reduce the autonomy of 
their decisions. On the other hand, the use of organisation makes it possible to reduce 
the transaction costs that arise in the bargaining process and to establish a certain 
control or power over the wage costs of the market. 
 
For the joint analysis of social actors and their strategies we will follow the 
guidelines set out by Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel (2001). These authors suggest that the 
organisational characteristics (territorial and sectoral representativeness, power, 
memberships, etc). of trade union and employers’ organisations influence the 
effectiveness of their actions, and consequently the organisational form and the results 
of their collective bargaining processes. However, inversely, the characteristics of the 
social partners are also directly related to systems of bargaining and their traits, and are 
associated with their interaction.  
 
Methodological aspects 
 
This paper should be considerer as research note based in discussion with other 
studies and also it is the result of an initial exploration of the object of study carried out 
in 2005. During this year we have done 13 interviews as initial exploration in this topic. 
In other words, it is a qualitative study based on interviews and discussion groups with 
representatives of the employers' associations and with the trade union representatives 
of CCOO and the UGT3, and the analysis of documents of the main Spanish employers' 
associations and trade unions.  
 
On the following pages we will follow the line provided by the operationalisation of 
the concept of governability explained above. We will first deal with the dimension of 
power by considering the institutional legal framework that legitimises the capacity for 
intervention of the trade unions and employers' associations through the Workers' 
Statute and the Organic Law of Trade Union Freedom. It is also important here to 
                                                 
3 CCOO (Comisiones Obreras); UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores), CEOE (Confederación Española 
de Organizaciones Empresariales). 
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observe the overall degree of coverage of the  workers, which through  the erga omnes 
clauses guarantees the extent of collective agreements. Secondly, we will deal with the 
dimension of domain , by considering the institutional framework that regulates the 
domain in which the social partners can operate and their effective presence on the 
collective bargaining commissions; this domain is based on the legitimacy provided by 
the degree of representativeness resulting from the trade union elections, which in turn 
affects the composition of the members of the collective bargaining commissions. 
Thirdly, we will deal with the effective control capacity of the social partners, by 
exploring the efficiency of the collective agreements and the alignment of pay with the 
objectives of controlling inflation and with the objectives of the social partners. 
 
Table 1.1. Dimensions of the  concept of governability. 
Dimensions  Categories Indicators for the Spanish case 
1. Power The institutional design of trade 
unions as actors in collective 
bargaining. 
The institutional design of 
employers’ organisation as actors 
in collective bargaining. 
 
 
Workers Statute, (WS, 1980)  
Trade Union Freedom Law (LOLS, 1985) 
Low rate of membership (17%);  
Electoral audience and high degree of legitimacy 
(74% participation of the workers in the trade union 
elections); high degree of representativeness 
recognised of CCOO + UGT jointly and of the 
CEOE. 
Reduction of transaction cost. 
Control of labour markets. 
Collective bargaining coverage. Erga Omnes with the force of law: high collective 
bargaining coverage (80-85%). 
2. Domain Institutional framework of 
collective bargaining. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domain of social partners in 
collective bargaining. 
 
Mixed structure of collective agreements, adapted to 
characteristics of the sectors, organisational 
characteristics of the social partners and tradition. 
 
Little presence of occupational or autonomous trade 
unions  CCOO and the UGT have 76% of the 
representatives on the bargaining commissions. 
 
Social partners representing employers: many 
independent employers' organisations, (which keeps 
them close to the interests of their members), though 
most are associated with the CEOE. 
3. Control 
capacity 
Power of employers' organisations 
and trade unions to prevent free-
riding behaviour in bargaining. 
Legal recognition of the representativeness Statutory 
collective agreements have the same status as the 
law: they have the force of law with universal 
application. 
Mixed structure of collective bargaining: 53% of 
workers covered by provincial agreements; 28%  by 
national agreements; 11% by company agreements 
and 7% by local agreements. 
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1. THE FIRST DIMENSION: THE POWER AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN OF UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATIONS 
 
The institutional design of trade unions 
 
The present design of the legal framework of trade unions in Spain goes back, in 
its fundamentals, to the years of transition to democracy. The Spanish Constitution of 
1978 recognised trade unions as the representatives of the general economic and social 
interests of workers, thus making them a basic element of the democratic political 
system4. This proposal is developed in the Estatuto de los Trabajadores (Workers’ 
Statute) of 1980, and in the Ley Orgánica de Libertad Sindical (LOLS, Trade Union 
Freedom Law) of 1985, in the following terms: 
 
a) Institutional recognition of the representative nature of trade unions on 
the basis of results in the election of committee members or trade-union 
representatives. Trade unions are recognised as having the capacity to exercise, 
within the sphere in which they obtain representative status and as a 
consequence of that status, the role of representatives of workers, whether or not 
these be affiliated. 
 
b) Creation of the figure of the ‘most representative’ trade union, which 
is recognised as having the function of representing workers (whether they are 
not members) in relation to public administrative bodies. One that obtains more 
than 10% of the committee members or trade-union representatives at the 
national level, or 15% in an autonomous community in the case of regional trade 
unions achieves the status of the 'most representative' trade union. 
 
                                                 
4 Baylos (1991) and Valdés Dal-Ré (1996) contend that the Spanish Constitution bestows broad faculties 
on trade unions with the objective of avoiding a power vacuum in a context of lack of tradition and of 
strong institutions in industrial relations. 
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c) The institutionally recognised functions and representative nature of 
trade unions are reinforced by means of the legal regulation of collective 
agreements, in particular with their status of equivalence to the law and with the 
erga omnes extension clause. The result of these clauses on the general 
effectiveness of collective agreements is a high rate of coverage (85-90%), 
which indicates the great power of collective agreements (Martín Artiles and 
Alós-Moner 2003). 
 
d) The law establishes a difference in functions between workers’ 
committees and trade unions. The former are assigned the faculties of 
representation and negotiation within the firm, which means that the committee 
has full authorisation to represent all the staff and to bargain for collective 
agreements or for any other kind of accord within the firm. However, the 
Spanish LOLS law also recognises the trade union as having the capacity to act 
within the firm, and does not establish a clear delimitation of the functions of 
each body, that is to say, of the workers’ committee and the trade union. On the 
other hand, trade unions are exclusively authorised to represent workers and 
negotiate outside the firm (supra-enterprise bargaining and social accords). 
 
The institutional design of employers’ organisations 
 
The organisation of employer interests in Spain could be described as complex. 
The Spanish Confederation of Employers’ Organisation (CEOE) is the main 
organisation; it enjoys maximum representative status and is recognised in this regard 
by the legal and institutional system. The CEOE is made up of multiple interrelated 
territorial and sectoral organisations with overlapping memberships,5 and there is 
consequently no direct formal membership to it. Therefore, firms belong directly or 
indirectly to a number of associations, which makes it difficult to establish a direct 
relationship between firms and the organisation or to determine the degree of 
membership. 
 
                                                 
5 The data of the CEOE offered in 2002 provide figures from 200 territorial and sectoral associations at 
the level of autonomous communities and 2002 base associations. 
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The organisational-institutional design has its origin mainly in a series of factors 
that affect the governability of the various organisations and the results of collective 
bargaining. 
 
a) The size of enterprises itself, which registers a high presence of small 
and medium enterprises, varying in accordance with the productive sectors and 
with the market structure that such firms show. In Spain, the average size of the 
firm, i.e. the average number of workers, is very low (five employees). Although 
99% of the enterprises are small and medium-sized firms, this figure is not 
shared out evenly either in the country or in the various productive sectors. The 
average number of workers doubles in the industrial sector in comparison with 
the service sector; in certain branches of production, large firms are predominant 
(for instance, in energy and banking) and in certain regions there is a high 
concentration of productive activity, such as in textiles and chemicals in the 
Mediterranean area. 
 
The size of firms and their market power condition the organisational 
structure of employers’ associations. In the sectors in which there are large and 
medium-sized firms, the force of association lies in their national sectoral  
associations. On the other hand, in the sectors that are highly atomised at the 
employer level, the force of association lies in the territorial organisations. Such 
organisations make the market power of firms more robust in a particular 
product or area. 
 
b) The historical factors conditioning the creation of a complex network 
of employers’ organisations and a supreme organisation that inherited part of the 
structure and leadership of the former vertical trade union (Martínez Lucio 
1992). The learning process, as much from the organisational as from the 
bargaining point of view, has been very much influenced by the heritage of the 
vertical trade union, which integrated all social partners into a single 
organisation. This lies at the origin of many of the present structures and 
employer-representation processes at work when collective agreements are being 
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negotiated, and this is especially the case at the provincial sector level, where it 
affects the negotiating style and behaviour. 
 
 
2. THE SECOND DIMENSION: THE DOMAIN OF SOCIAL PARTNERS IN 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
 The domain of the social partners in collective bargaining, that is, the capacity to 
represent the heterogeneous interests of workers, is ensured by the institutional and 
legislative framework, and by the organisational characteristics of the employers' 
organisations and trade unions. Furthermore, the domain is ensured by the 
representativeness of the trade union elections, which in turn influences the composition 
of the bargaining commissions. We will consider these two questions here. 
 
 
The institutional framework of collective bargaining 
 
The governability of collective bargaining in Spain is a process that is carried 
out through consent and cooperation among the actors. The general guidelines agreed to 
by the leadership at the central level are subsequently implemented with a considerable 
degree of autonomy at the levels of the sector, province, and firm. This subsequent 
development depends not only on consent, but also on the traditions and customs of 
each level of negotiation. Likewise, the law, through the erga omnes clauses, the 
qualitative concept of representative status, and the ultra-activity6 of collective 
agreements, all contribute to this governability.  
 
State intervention and labour legislation make up for the weakness and 
fragmentation of the representation of interests and play an important role in the 
Spanish system of labour relations. Below we will consider the most characteristic traits 
of the Spanish institutional system in which the governability of trade unions and the 
governability of employers associations play a key role. 
 
                                                 
6 This concept refers to the non-expiry of an agreement until another is signed that makes it invalid. 
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2.1. Governability of trade-unions 
 
The main trade unions in Spain, Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) and Union 
General de Trabajadores (UGT), are characterised by a double commitment: one of 
these stems from their political and ideological ties, and the other stems from the 
‘political delegation’ or trust that workers place in them (Miguélez 2000). From this 
double commitment there arises a permanent conflict between the political and 
ideological component, which provides identity and scarce but solid membership 
resources, and pragmatism, which supplies recognition and membership resources, 
albeit weak ones. 
 
 
The following points should be taken into account: 
 
a) Trade union competition and co-operation. The plurality of trade unions 
(which has its root in their political and ideological links) gives rise to constant 
tension between competition and co-operation between them. Competition and co-
operation appear at all levels in trade-union structures, and in a variety of forms. The 
need for recognition (on the part of workers, but also on the part of the firms) lies at 
the bottom of both competition and co-operation between trade unions; likewise, the 
political and ideological commitment generates relationships of co-operation at the 
same time as ones of competition. 
 
b) Membership and audience. Trade-union membership is recognised to be 
low or very low, and is in fact one of the lowest in the European sphere. Various 
factors contribute to the prevalence of the figure of the free rider. These include the 
productive structure with its very high presence of small firms, the system of erga 
omnes clauses for collective agreements, and the prevalence among workers of a 
culture of little active participation. Consequently, in accordance with the 
suggestions made by Checchi and Lucifora (2002), the existing institutional 
regulations lead trade unions to compete basically for representative status rather 
than for membership. However, the trade-union audience (measured through the 
vote, or through the acceptance of trade unions and their proposals) tends to be, on 
14 
 
the contrary, fairly or very high. The institutionally recognised faculties of the trade 
unions and their pragmatism make a decisive contribution to this situation. 
 
c) The principle of audience and institutional representative status that trade 
unions are acknowledged to have implies that for them the active participation of 
their members is not indispensable. This does not mean that membership is not 
important, as it provides human and financial resources, but it does not acquire the 
dimensions that Offe and Wiesenthal (1992) attribute to it. 
 
Trade unions are organisations possessing highly complex structures. They have 
a confederal leadership (a confederal secretariat or executive); the various federations, 
with their respective structures and governing bodies; the trade-union delegates or the 
organisations of the trade union in firms; and finally the members of the trade union 
elected as the unitary representatives of the workers in firms. 
 
Each element within a single organisation has a high degree of autonomy in its 
respective sphere. Nevertheless, each one depends upon the others in order to be 
recognised. For instance, the confederal leadership requires the explicit or implicit 
support of the federations, regional organisations, and representatives in firms; likewise, 
the latter owe their very existence to the support given by the organisation as a whole. 
This complex relationship entails the ability of the parts making up a trade union to 
maintain quite autonomous stances within their sphere of activity, even while under the 
unavoidable obligation of belonging to the organisation, which limits leakages from, or 
ruptures within, it: in other words, in spite of their autonomy, the parts of the 
organisation must avoid taking positions involving plain and open confrontation.7 All of 
this implies the necessity for a strong consensus, albeit one having wide margins of 
‘dissimulated’ discretion that will avoid open confrontation. 
 
                                                 
7 On the basis of case studies, Escobar (1993) and Pimentel (1993) conclude that workers’ committees 
and the trade unions in firms tend to act with a high degree of independence in respect of the strategies of 
the trade union organisations. Nevertheless each one seeks to avoid open conflict with the other, which 
moderates differences. 
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Tolerance and the acceptance of cooperation become an important value in the 
face of the diversity of interests represented by trade unions.8 This helps to avoid the 
dilemma stated by Offe and Wiesenthal (1992) in regard to the difficulties trade unions 
have in governing a plurality of interests. This tolerance and acceptance of consensus is 
reinforced by pragmatism.9 Thus, the internal governability of organisations is 
improved, even when they lack the centralised control mechanisms and the systems of 
sanctions typical of bureaucratic organisations. 
 
 
2.2.The governability of employers’ organisations 
 
Throughout Spain the representative status of the CEOE is guaranteed by the 
law. Regional and sectoral associations are therefore affiliated to the CEOE so that it 
will represent them, thus helping to legitimise the organisation’s function as a social 
interlocutor and a guarantor of social harmony. From the time of its creation the 
CEOE’s priorities have been the political consolidation of Spain and the strengthening 
of the market economy (Costas and Nonell 1996). On the basis of these strategic 
objectives it participated in and promoted the signing of centralised bargaining 
agreements that were applied by the other elements in the fabric of associations, and by 
firms. Consequently, the governability of the CEOE is directly related to the reduction 
of transaction costs in terms of a lessening of social conflict in firms and a reduction in 
working hours lost. 
 
The reasons that induce a firm to join the CEOE and cede its representativeness 
to the association are: 
 
                                                 
8 According to  the interviews held with the trade unions UGT and CCOO, it is important to acknowledge 
the efforts toward internal co-ordination carried out by trade unions through the creation of opinion, 
internal meetings, internal sessions, and training. Direct intervention, involving sanctions, is limited only 
to extreme cases of open conflict, namely, of breach of the basic rules of behaviour within the 
organisation. 
9 There are numerous examples in this regard. Among others, in the building construction sector the 
elimination of seniority payments has been accepted; in some firms the trade-union negotiators have 
agreed to a double wage scale; in other firms there is an avoidance of outright refusals with regard to the 
treatment of overtime and shorter working hours. 
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a) The reduction of transaction costs and of the costs involved in the 
negotiation of working conditions. Spanish employers show a certain 
resistance, especially because of the small size of businesses, to 
undertake collective bargaining at the level of the firm.  Therefore they 
tend to delegate the responsibility for bargaining to a representative of 
the firm, as most collective bargaining takes place at an intermediate, 
i.e. provincial, negotiating level. In turn, provincial collective 
agreements constitute a source of income for the solicitors and law 
firms that represent the employers’ organisations. This provincial 
structure is a legacy from the past and lists strongly in the direction of 
tradition and local customs. 
 
b) Regional and sectoral organisations offer, in the main, consulting and 
training services to their firms. In the case of Spain, the services that 
they offer differ widely from association to association. An additional 
service is the management of the funds devoted to occupational 
training, which has been beset by problems and a lack of transparency. 
 
The governability of the CEOE in Spain can therefore be considered on two 
levels: the national level and the regional and sectoral level. 
 
At the national level firms and their regional associations yield responsibility to 
the CEOE through centralised collective bargaining or national agreements when 
economic results are not favourable and price tensions are reflected in the worsening of 
business results. The difficulty that public policy encounters in controlling the evolution 
of prices with traditional instruments and the loss of credibility of the forecasts for the 
evolution of the RPI introduce a high cost in intermediate collective bargaining, and this 
makes it preferable for the CEOE to negotiate centralised agreements in order to 
guarantee a stable bargaining scenario. 
 
The second level of bargaining is at the regional and sectoral level. At the 
regional level, the relationship between the CEOE and the intermediate representative 
organisations is not without conflict. For instance, at the time of the 1994 labour 
17 
 
reforms, national sectoral collective agreements began to undergo significant changes as 
a result of the application of the reforms and the appearance of collective bargaining 
with a certain innovatory capacity. The CEOE, which was not involved in the process, 
recommended in 1995 that wage restraint should be negotiated in exchange for the non-
introduction of substantial changes in collective agreements. In 1996 it stated openly 
that it was against the experience undertaken in certain businesses of introducing 
flexibility mechanisms through double wage scales or pacts concerning compensation 
(Aguar, Molins and Casademunt 1999); it also blocked the signing of agreements at the 
level of the autonomous communities.10 In 1997 it recovered its involvement by signing 
a new centralised agreement for the reform of the conditions governing work contracts 
and for collective bargaining. 
 
Finally, there is a shortfall of governability at the lowest regional levels, the 
associational fabric is weak in certain sectors, and there are conflicts between levels of 
representation. There are sectors in which organised employer interests do not exist, and 
there are also sectors appearing—above all in the sector of services related to new 
activities—in which employer associational activity is undergoing transformations. 
 
a) In regard to the first case, the lack of employer representation 
became evident in the 1997 centralised agreement, in which the so-called 
Acuerdo de Vacíos (Agreement on Voids) was made, this name referring to 
the fact that after the disappearance of the Labour Ordinances, there was no 
type of industrial relations agreement in certain sectors. The cause of this 
institutional void is to be found in the lack of employer representatives for 
the negotiation of the new agreements. 
 
b) In the second case, it can be seen that in emerging sectors the 
large firms that make their entry with market power are interested in taking 
on the representation of employers at the national level, thus taking 
responsibility away from the regional levels in order to control labour costs. 
This is the case of the agreement governing temporary employment agencies 
                                                 
10 In Catalonia, the social partners had a collective bargaining agreement at the autonomous community 
level ready to sign; it introduced in its turn mechanisms for resolving disputes out of court. At the last 
moment, the Catalan employers withdrew (Aguiar, Molins and  Casademunt, 1999). 
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(TEAs), in which despite the existence of collective bargaining agreements 
at the autonomous community level, the large firms established throughout 
the market have made themselves into a national employers’ association and 
have taken negotiations to a national level. 
 
In short, the dynamics of the various interest-group representative organisations 
can be explained by the role that each of them plays in the representation of employer 
interests in collective bargaining. Sectoral bargaining thus coexists at the provincial 
level (metal) and the national level (textiles and building construction). This complex 
system of collective bargaining is taken for granted in the strategies of employers’ 
associations, and it is understood that there should be no decisive initiatives to alter it, 
but simply solutions for the difficulties of co-ordination and articulation that may 
appear. 
 
 
2.3. The composition of bargaining commissions 
 
In respect of the representative status of the social partners in Spain, 74.7% of 
the signatories to collective agreements before 2002 belonged to CCOO or the UGT 
(Comisiones Obreras and Unión General de Trabajadores, the two main trade union 
organisations in Spain). This figure rose to 77.3% in 2003 (Table 2.1). In the same 
period, other trade unions increased their presence slightly, while the presence of 
workers not belonging to any trade union declined sharply. 
 
Table 2.1: Share of representatives sighning collective agreement.  
Share of Collective agreements in relation to signatories. 
 1998 2003 Variation 
CCOO 38.1 39,2 +1.1 
UGT 36.6 38,1 +1.4 
Other trade unions 15.3 15.1 -0.2 
Groups of workers 10.5 7.4 -3.1 
TOTAL 100 100  
Source: Consejo Económico y Social (1999 and 2004) 
 
The legitimacy of trade unions is also evinced in the results of trade-union 
elections. The latest figures available for 1990 offer the following scenario: 
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Table 2.2: Participation in elections of trade-union representatives in firms. 
Spain, 1990  
Total wage-earners (*) [1] 9,372,500 
Wage-earners in firms with elections [2] 5,373,613 
Voters [3] 3,974,406 
[2] out of [1] (*) 53.7% 
[3] out of [2] 74.0% 
 
(*) The figure for wage-earners refers to the total number of wage-earners according to the Encuesta de Población 
Activa (Survey of the Active Population); nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that only workers in firms with six or 
more employees can participate in the electoral processes.  
Source: Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security (1992), cited by CES (2004). The figures are not more 
up-to-date because since the responsibilities in this regard were transferred to the Autonomous Communities, no more 
aggregate figures have been published at the national level. 
 
Finally, the participation of workers in the electoral processes for trade-union 
representatives is quite high (74%, Table 2.2), which demonstrates a degree of 
commitment to, or trust in, such processes and the candidates. Furthermore 77.3% of the 
representatives elected by the workers are from candidatures presented by CCOO and 
UGT, and this percentage has been rising since the advent of democracy to Spain 
(Miguélez 1999). However, as collective agreements are governed by the Workers’ 
Statute, which states that to have general validity they must be signed by more than 
50% of the representatives of each party, UGT and CCOO are rarely able to control 
bargaining without each other, though in some cases they can seek the support of a third 
trade union with sufficient strength (this is only possible in very specific sectors or in 
the autonomous communities of Euskadi, Navarra and Galicia). It is therefore not 
surprising that for approximately ten years CCOO and the UGT have reached 
agreements on the criteria for approaching collective bargaining. 
 
3. THE THIRD DIMENSION: CONTROL CAPACITY AND THE RESULTS OF 
BARGAINING  
 
 The capacity for controlling collective bargaining leads us to the debate between 
centralisation and decentralisation, and to the structure and efficiency of the collective 
bargaining system. We will explore these two questions and we will then observe the 
results of collective bargaining as empirical evidence of its degree of governability. 
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Governability and the sphere of collective bargaining 
 
From the interviews carried out for this paper, several employer and trade-union 
strategies can be seen. Large firms are interested in the centralisation of collective 
bargaining as a procedure for the harmonisation of costs and the reduction of transaction 
costs (e.g. the agreement in the building-construction sector and the TEA agreement). 
On the other hand, small firms seem to have a preference for regional (provincial) 
collective agreements, in order to maintain a negotiating structure closer to the local 
sphere. In short, the interests, practices, and bargaining positions of firms reveal 
complexities and contradictions that cannot be reduced to a simple choice between 
decentralising or centralising collective bargaining. 
 
Trade unions are interested in the centralisation and co-ordination of collective 
bargaining for obvious reasons of worker solidarity, but also because sectoral collective 
agreements are more dynamic and productive of renewal than agreements made at a 
lower level. The agreements of firms are perhaps less dynamic. Nevertheless, trade 
unions cannot neglect the local sphere, as they must remain close to those they represent 
and must maintain identity and legitimacy, as these things definitely contribute to their 
governability. 
 
In the light of the results of our work it is necessary to reflect on proposals for 
the reform of collective bargaining. The application to Spain of the theories on the 
benefits of the inverted U has focused reform proposals on the need to modify the 
structure of collective bargaining by fostering decentralisation, and to improve its 
articulation by promoting national agreements aimed at favouring decentralised 
negotiations. This, in turn, would allow a reduction of the inflationary tendency of 
provincial sector agreements, as the Banco de España argues, and as the Partido 
Popular also maintained when it was in government.  
 
In a recent work, Izquierdo, Moral and Urtasum (2003) contend that 53.75% of 
workers are affected by a provincial agreement. The authors defend the necessity of 
reforming the levels of intermediate negotiation as these show their inefficiency in the 
results. 
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Even so, it is not sustainable to attribute exclusively to this level of provincial 
negotiation the conditions of economic inefficiency alluded to in the theories based on 
the thesis of the “hump” or inverted U. Experience shows that although wage 
bargaining may be concentrated at the provincial level, the scope that firms have for 
fixing wages is greater than when wage agreements are made under the influence of an 
expansive economic cycle. The structure of collective bargaining in Spain is a reality 
that remains fairly constant in time (Table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1 Structure and levels of collective bargaining 
Level Number of 
Agreements 
Workers 
 1994 2003 1994 2003 
Firm 2,309 3,263 688,491 908, 363 
Sectoral-provincial 772 896 3,006,613 4,532,352 
Sectoral-local 17 12 6,741 11,011 
Sectoral-inter-provincial 25 56 481,208 823,138 
Sectoral-autonomous 
community 
- 22 - 823,188 
Sectoral-inter-autonomous 
community 
- - - - 
Sectoral-national 43 65 991,117 1,806,845 
Total 3,192 4,364 5,184,294 8,147,177 
 
Source: The available figures correspond to the 1994 and 2003 and were published in CES (1995): Memoria sobre la situación 
socioeconómica y laboral. Madrid, pp. 224; likewise, CES (2004): Memoria sobre la situación socioeconómica y laboral. Madrid, 
pp. 369. 
 
At the provincial levels of bargaining the agreed wage rises are higher than those 
at the national level, although there is less wage dispersion. One instance of distortion 
lies in the differences in wages between the various provincial agreements in the same 
productive activity. For example, it can be seen that the metal-workers agreement 
negotiated at the provincial level in Catalonia is led by the province of Barcelona, and 
that the other three Catalan provinces follow similar lines, but on the subject of wage-
fixing and nominal wages there are considerable differences. These differences can be 
explained by the sphere of regional competition of the firms in the sector. In this case, 
the vehicle distributors or workshops included in this branch of production exercise 
their market power by forcing a differentiation of wages at the provincial level, though 
it must be borne in mind that the large automobile firms have agreements of their own. 
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By way of contrast, in the sectors of production in which national sectoral 
agreements are reached (textiles, chemicals, graphic arts, department stores), an 
employer strategy can be detected. An instance of this is in the agreement in the textile 
sector, which has a nation-wide market but is highly concentrated in Catalonia. Catalan 
firms are interested in negotiating at this national level in order to set minimums on the 
overall wage costs of all competing firms. 
 
The results of collective bargaining 
 
The governability of collective bargaining in Spain can also be confirmed on the 
basis of the results that it obtains. In this sense, it can be seen that collective agreements 
are gradually adapting to the demands and orientations that both employer and trade-
union organisations are concerned to further. 
 
Annual wage increases are governable through the guidelines accepted by 
employer and trade-union leadership when there are centralised agreements, and by 
intermediate organisations in other collective bargaining sessions. These annual wage-
increase guidelines are agreed by the social partners (especially employers) because 
habitually they are guidelines as to minima and reduce transaction costs. The result is 
wage restraint, as shown in the following table (Table 3.2), which demonstrates the 
governability of collective bargaining. 
 
 Table 3.2 Inflation and wage increases as part of agreements, 1985-2000 
Years Wage increase 
(with an escape 
clause) (1) 
Forecast inflation 
(guides collective 
bargaining) 
Annual 
inflation 
(2) 
Increase in 
purchasing 
power (1-2) 
1985 7.9 7.0 8.8 - 0.9 
1986 8.2 8.0 8.8 - 0.6 
1987 6.5 5.0 5.2 1.3 
1988 6.4 3.0 4.8 1.5 
1989 7.8 3.0 6.8 1.0 
1990 8.3 5.7 6.7 1.6 
1991 8.0 5.0 5.9 2.1 
1992 7.3 5.0 5.9 1.4 
1993 5.5 4.5 4.6 0.9 
1994 3.6 3.5 4.7 - 1.1 
1995 3.9 3.5 4.7 - 0.8 
1996 3.8 3.5 3.6 - 0.2 
1997 2.9 2.2 2.0 0.9 
23 
 
1998 2.6 2.1 1.8 0.8 
1999 2.7 1.8 2.3 0.4 
2000 3.7 2.0 3.4 0.3 
2001 3.6 2.8 3.6 0.0 
2002          3,8 2,0 3,5 0,3 
2003          3,7 2,0 3,0 0,7 
2004          3,6 2,7 3,2 0,4 
Source: Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, Statistics for collective agreements.  Spanish Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística. Cited in the Memoria sobre la situación socioeconómica y laboral. Consejo Económico y Social, Madrid 2002; pp. 406. 
and 2004, pp. 328 
  
 This table shows the existence of a high degree of control in the behaviour of 
pay in relation to the forecast inflation rate, as has been stated by recognised researchers 
such as Fina et al. (2001: 164): “The reasons for the downward trend of [pay] drifts 
correspond to the influence of collective bargaining and the increasingly close 
connection between agreed pay and earned pay.” Another researcher (Royo 2002) 
claims that Spanish collective bargaining is a model in which pay rises adapt to the 
levels set by the social partners. It is thus obvious that, as Pérez Infante (2003) 
concludes, collective bargaining does not generate inflation.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The institutions that favour governability are directly related to 1) the 
generalised extension clauses that allow a major coverage of collective bargaining and 
favour the co-ordination of decisions; 2) the legal representative status of the social 
partners as a substitution for organisational centralisation; and 3) the fact that 
bargaining power is sustained by collective bargaining regulations. Obviously Spanish 
model of governability has its limitations, its tensions and even its crisis in some 
periods.   
  
Given that the governability of collective bargaining is based on the existing 
institutional framework, on the strategies of social agents and on their interaction with 
the policy of macro-economic stabilisation, our proposal is along the lines of the 
hypothesis advanced by Kittel and Traxler (2001), who stress that the key to explaining 
the interactions between collective bargaining institutions and monetary policy is not 
the degree of centralisation or decentralisation of that bargaining, but rather its 
governability. In this regard, we accept their criticism of the inverted U theory of 
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Calmfors and Driffill (1988) on centralised and decentralised models of bargaining, and 
their results on economic activity and inflation and unemployment-control policies. 
 
Notwithstanding this, our notion of governability depends not only on the 
organisational structures of the social partners, but also on other legal and cultural 
elements such as customs, values, traditions and consensus, i.e. the institutional 
framework of the labour market. These elements also provide the system of industrial 
relations with rationality. With this new variable, the Spanish model could be classified 
as peak-level governability through institutional regulation. 
 
There is more governability in Spain than may be suggested by the theoretical 
models, and this can be observed in the governability of wage policies, as has been 
stressed. We may conclude, from a comparative perspective, that the model governs 
itself in spite of low density and organisational weakness. We are therefore critical of 
the theoretical approaches of some comparative studies and of their exclusively 
quantitative analytical dimensions. 
 
Finally, this paper seeks to contribute certain reflections to the comparative 
debate on the study of industrial relations through the concept of governability, which 
also depends on the institutional framework, as it involves legal matters and others to do 
with the culture of the country that establish a national style. In conclusion, the 
examination of the dimensions of power, domain and control capacity has allowed us to 
explain the peculiar capacity for governability of the Spanish collective bargaining 
system, despite the organisational weakness of the trade unions and employers' 
associations. This conclusion may have important implications for economic policy.   
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